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APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
§78-6-3(2)
Not later than two days before the date of trial
regarding the original affidavit, the defendant may upon the
payment of the fee prepare a counteraffidavit as set forth in
§78-6-2.5, or at his request the judge or justice or clerk of the
court shall draft the counteraffidavit for him.
§78-6-10
(1) The judgment of the small claims department of the
justices1 and circuit court is conclusive upon the plaintiff
unless a counterclaim has been interposed.
(2) If the matter is heard in the small claims department of the circuit court, the defendant may appeal the judgment
of the circuit court to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice
of appeal within five days of the entry of the judgment against
him.
(3) If the matter is heard in the small claims department of the justices1 court, the defendant may obtain a trial de
novo in the circuit court by filing in the circuit court of the
county a petition for trial de novo within five days of the entry
of the judgment against him.
§78-27-38
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant.
U.R.C.P. 13
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where
any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in
an action in a city court or justice's court, and due to its
limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to grant
the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in
the entire action and certify the same and transmit all papers
therein to the district court of the county in which such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment by the party filing such
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim of the fees
required for certifying the record on appeal from such court and
for docketing the same in the district court. The fees herein
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required to be paid, shall be deposited with the clerk of the
inferior court at the time of filing such counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so to do, the
court may, upon motion of the adverse party, after notice, strike
such counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.
U.R.C.P. 19
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or in a proper
case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to
venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action
improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not
feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(l-(2)
hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment
rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or
those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether
a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate;
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the
action is dismissed for non-joinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading
asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to
the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision
(a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they
are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject
to the provisions of Rule 23.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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U.R.C.P. 52
(A) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon . . .
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DESCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This action was commenced in Salt Lake County Circuit
Court, Small Claims Division, Salt Lake Department and tried
before a judge pro tempore on January 29, 1987 and final judgment
entered on January 31, 1987. This Court has jurisdiction to hear
this appeal pursuant to §78-6-10(2) U.C.A. (amended 1986).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This Court is being asked to consider the following
issues on appeal:
1. Whether the competent and relevant evidence adduced
at trial was sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
2.

Whether trial court erred in failing to grant

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice based upon Rule
19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

Whether trial court erred in failing to apply the

provisions of §78-27-38 U.C.A. (as amended) in determining
damages or determining value of damages.
4.

Whether the trial court's failure to make findings

of fact and conclusions of law to establish the basis of judgment
and upon what finding relief was granted requires reversal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Hood brought an action in Small Claims Court,
Salt Lake Department Circuit Court seeking compensation from
Defendant Layton for property damage done to Hood's automobile as
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the result of a collision.

Layton sought dismissal without

prejudice to seek joinder of Jean Pahl, who was the driver of
Hood's vehicle, and to remove the matter to the Circuit Court by
counterclaiming or cross-claiming in accordance with Rule 13 (k),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court denied the motion and

trial was had on January 29, 1987, and judgment was granted in
favor of Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 27, 1986, Charles V. Layton and immediate
family members traveled to the residence of his ex-wife, Jean
Pahl, to recover Mr. Layton1s boat then in the possession of Ms.
Pahl.

During the course of recovery, Layton and his brother each

drove separate vehicles into the parking lot where the boat was
located.

Layton attached the boat to his truck and commenced to

exit the lot preceded by his brother when Jean Pahl appeared in a
1973 Toyota Corolla owned by her sister Suzanne Hood and blocked
the driveway.
Following a curt discussion between Layton1s brother
and Pahl, the Hood vehicle backed up to allow passage.

While

Layton followed his brother one or more collisions occurred
involving his truck and the Hood auto.

Each party asserted at

trial that the collision was intentionally caused by the other
driver.
Layton was prosecuted by Salt Lake County Attorney on
behalf of the State of Utah for violation of 76-6-106 U.C.A.
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(as amended) for Criminal Mischief, a Third Degree Felony due to
damage in excess of $1,000.00.

The matter was reduced to a Class

A misdemeanor at preliminary hearing, and ultimately dismissed
upon joint motion of the parties.
Hood filed this action on January $, 19 87 and Layton
was served on the evening of January 22, 1987. Upon receiving
copy of the served affidavit and in order to preserve any actions
since the time for counterclaim by Defendant under §78-6-3(2)
U.C.A. (amended 1986) had expired, counsel filed a notice of
intent to counterclaim in excess of jurisdictional amount as well
as a motion to dismiss the affidavit without prejudice since Hood
had not named Pahl as a party.

The motion was denied and trial

proceeded.
At trial clearly inadmissible hearsay was admitted, as
well as other conjectural, speculative and irrelevant evidence.
Undisputed, however, was the fact that Layton1s brother preceded
him out of the lot and that Pahl initially had driven Hood's car
to a position blocking the driveway exit.

Pahl backed up to

allow passage of the first vehicle and the collision occurred
thereafter.

The motion was not due to failure of witnesses to appear or
lack of evidence, as indicated at trial in this matter, but based
upon statements of witnesses not appearing at this trial.
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At the close of the case, the judge pro tempore found
for the Plaintiff, but did not relate the evidence upon which he
relied on the legal basis for such relation.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial below failed to produce sufficient competent
and relevant evidence to sustain the Plaintiff's burden of proof,
therefore the judgment is in error.
The trial court erred in proceeding without directing
the joinder of an indispensable party under Rule 19, U.R.C.P.,
and in its assessment of damages.
Following the conclusion of trial, the court failed to
properly make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in
contravention of the requirements of Rule 52, U.R.C.P.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT
FOR PLAINTIFF BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE
As a threshhold question, this Court should first
examine whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to
sustain a judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

12

Appellant herein

asserts that taken in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, the total evidence is, at best, a wash and fails to
sustain Plaintiff's burden of proof.

2/
Generally, the court should view with some incredulity the
issue of insufficiency of evidence in a small claims action.
However, the underlying procedural defects presently existing in
the process, and later discussed herein, create the notion that
this issue is at least symptomatic and therefore should be
reviewed.
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Initially it could be argued that there is no appropriate standard to apply since this judgment stands absent any
formal finding of fact in support.

Otherwise, such findings

should be scrutinized in a light most favorable to the prevailing
party and with deference to the proximity of the fact-finder
below.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (1985); Sharpe v.

American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P.2d 185 (1983).
However, a generic approach would still contemplate the
axiom that judgments supported by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing proof cannot be disturbed on appeal.
MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464, 12 U.2d 427 (1962).

Lynch v.

In that case, the

Utah Supreme Court said that where a case is decided at least in
part upon conflicting evidence, the view of that evidence taken
by the trial court should be favored.
Unfortunately in this case, it is impossible to determine which evidence the trial court favored.

Each of the parties

testified, along with their respective witnesses, and often in
cacophonous unison.

During the course of those testimonies,

clearly irrelevant and/or inadmissible statements were
proffered.

As encouraged by the instruction on the form pleadings,
neither party appeared with counsel. The apparent burden regarding questions of evidence obviously shifts to the trial court.
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While we cannot speculate what the court's ruling might have been
on specific objections, we can postulate that no evidence at
trial was so weighty as to satisfy the Plaintiff's burden, which
"requires that the evidence be such that
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could
believe that the existence of the fact is
more probable or more likely than its
non-existence, so that a person of ordinary
prudence could believe the fact with sufficient assurance to act upon it in relation to
matters of serious concern in his own affairs."
Morris v. Farmers Home
Mutual Insurance Co.,
500 P.2d 505, 507; 28
U.2d 206 (1972)
Whatever we have in this case, we clearly do not have
that level of proof so as to affirm the judgment of the trial
court, as so the judgment should be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 19

A portion of the error in this case can be attributed
to the recent amendment to §78-6-1 et seq. U.C.A. (amended 1986)
to small claims actions and appeals from judgment therefrom,
which were made effective a short time prior to the instigation
of this action.

That portion of the code likewise does not

provide for third-party action otherwise permitted by Rule 14,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the instant action, Layton was sued by Hood for
property damage incurred as a result of an auto collision although Hood was not the driver.

Layton desired a third-party
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action against the driver of Hood's car, which is not contemplated within the Small Claims Court Act.

Knowing that the amount in

controversy would exceed $1,000.00, Defendant filed a notice of
intention to file such claim pursuant to Rule 13 (k), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure so as to preserve any claims against those
parties under that rule. /4
The driver of Plaintiff's vehicle was not a party at
that time, and a motion to dismiss under Rule 19, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure (as amended) was filed in order to permit the
suit to be reinstituted in the Circuit Court.
Defendant asserts that failure to grant the Rule 19
motion was error because it adversely affected the full and fair
determination of rights of the parties to the lawsuit.

Cowen and

Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (1984).

For that

reason the driver, Jean Pahl, was a necessary party.

Johnson v.

Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (1980).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES
The Utah Comparative Negligence Statute §78-27-38

U.C.A. (as amended), provides:
"The fault of a person seeking recovery shall
not alone bar recovery by that person. He
may recover from any defendant or group of
defendants whose fault exceeds his own.
However, no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of
the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
4/
This precautionary measure appears to be unnecessary in light
of the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d
1372 (1986).
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The Appellant herein asserts that if the award of the
court was based upon the negligent operation of a vehicle, that
award should be reduced accordingly due to Hood's own negligence
in allowing her sister to operate Hood's vehicle while in such an
apparently agitated and irrational state.
The Defendant further asserts that there is no competent evidence to demonstrate the extent of damage to Hood's 1973
Toyota Corolla which would substantiate an award of $1,000.00.
IV.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REQUIRES REVERSAL

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
states:
(a) Effect. In al] actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon, . . .
This rule is unconditional, and subject only to the
waiver provisions of subsection (c) which do not apply in this
case.
It has been long held that failure of the trial court
to make findings of fact on all material issues is reversible
error where it is prejudicial.

Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233

(1983); Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392
(1980); Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 278 P.2d 284, 3 U.2d
43 (1954); Pike v. Clark, 79 P.2d 1010, 95 U. 235 (1938).
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When our inspired Legislature ordained the transition
of small claims court in the Circuit Courts system, the ramifications were unjustly ignored.

From a convenient and facilitating

forum for simple dispute resolution, it now exists as the most
recent venue in a morass of courts impossible to be utilized or
understood by the common person.
As an aside, but of some significance to the Appellant
in this case, is the curiosity that when the amendment of
§78-6-10 U.C.A. (amended 1986) was effected, the heading left in
the term "Attorney's fee" but the body is void of any reference
to entitlement by either party.

Appellant asserts his entitle-

ment to attorney fees in this matter and herein prays for that
relief.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the entire purpose of small claims court
has been defeated by this new legislation.

The Appellant re-

quests and this Court is compelled to remand this and similar
matters to the court below for further proceeding, until such
time as the procedures are consistent with the purpose.
DATED this

Q

day of May, 1987.

SCOTT W.
R E E D \ ^
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

S^

dav of May, 1987, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage
prepaid fully thereon, to Constable Suzanne Pood, 219 "J" Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103.
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